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s the eurozone stepping back from the brink? 
This might just be possible, because the 
emerging outlines of a new framework to resolve 
the ongoing sovereign debt crisis contain a key 
component that was missing so far. Indeed, that 
component’s absence was behind this summer’s 
spreading financial crisis, which moved beyond 
small, peripheral countries like Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal to strike systemically important countries 
like Italy and Spain. 
The starting point of the contagion was investors’ 
realisation that Europe’s rescue fund, the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), was designed to 
provide emergency financial support only to the 
peripheral countries. It simply does not and will 
never have sufficient funds to undertake the 
massive bond purchases required to stabilise the 
debt markets of large economies such as Spain and 
Italy. The EFSF will have at most €440 billion at its 
disposal (any increase would endanger France’s 
AAA rating), while the combined public debt of Italy 
and Spain is more than €2 trillion. 
In early August, the domino effect of the eurozone 
periphery’s sovereign debt crisis started to kick in, 
because financial markets do not wait for country 
after country to be downgraded. Instead, they tend 
to anticipate the endgame, or at least one potential 
scenario, namely the unravelling of the entire crisis-
containment structure.  
Markets noticed that the euro seemed caught 
between a rock (the EFSF’s limited borrowing 
capacity) and a hard place (the European Central 
Bank’s great reluctance to engage in large-scale 
purchases of financially troubled governments’ 
bonds). It later turned out that the ECB was not that 
hard after all, although it emphasised that it would 
stop intervening as soon as the new EFSF became 
operational. And, given the EFSF’s limited 
firepower, the market would have been left without 
support. 
To state the problem more generally, the eurozone 
requires a liquidity backstop for its fiscal authority. 
In a ‘normal’ economy with its own currency, the 
fiscal authorities can never face a liquidity shortage, 
because the government can always rely, at least 
potentially, on support from the central bank. A 
eurozone government, by contrast, is always in a 
precarious situation: it has only very long-term 
assets (its taxing power) and shorter-term 
liabilities, namely government debt, much of which 
has to be rolled over annually. If investors refuse to 
buy the country's debt on any terms, even a fiscally 
prudent government could find itself in a liquidity 
squeeze and become insolvent. 
Similarly, banks have short-term liabilities 
(deposits) and long-term assets, which they cannot 
liquidate quickly without incurring great losses. 
This is why all countries provide emergency 
liquidity support when a bank run materialises, as 
was done on a global scale when confidence in the 
banking sector collapsed alongside Lehman 
Brothers in 2008. 
Likewise, the eurozone needs a mechanism to 
confront runs on its member countries’ government 
debt. This requires that fiscal authorities have 
access to a large pool of liquidity in an emergency. 
Only the ECB can provide this insurance. 
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The good news is that a solution is now slowly 
taking shape that promises to create a mechanism 
by which the ECB could backstop the EFSF. This 
could be achieved simply by registering the EFSF as 
a bank, which would give it access to normal ECB 
refinancing on the same terms as other normal 
banks. The EFSF could then conduct very large 
purchases of government debt by leveraging up its 
limited capital through ECB refinancing, using the 
government bonds it is buying as collateral. 
In this way, the proper division of labour could be 
established. The EFSF would be responsible for 
dealing with fiscal crises in member states. For 
countries with solvency problems, an adjustment 
programme like those for Greece, Ireland or 
Portugal would be appropriate. But, for large 
countries facing a liquidity shortage, the EFSF could 
rely on support from the ECB. 
If investors know that a liquidity squeeze is no 
longer possible, they will refrain from speculative 
attacks on solvent countries. The near-panic 
conditions in financial markets eased as soon as 
rumours spread that this solution had at least been 
discussed behind closed doors. It now needs to be 
implemented. 
As always in Europe, there are legal and political 
obstacles to change. But even the most reluctant 
policy-makers recognise that the cost of inaction is 
too great. The legal obstacles to potential ‘monetary 
financing’ of the public sector in the European 
Union’s governing treaties can be overcome. The 
more important obstacle is Germany’s reluctance to 
admit publicly that ECB liquidity support for 
government debt markets can be crucial in 
maintaining financial stability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 